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Abstract 
The author suggests twelve hypotheses to revive enthusiasm as a political category and, 
eventually, to restate the possibility of political action. In this perspective, the enthusiasm of 
the masses was the essential political element of “The Glorious Thirty Years” that followed 
the Second War World, characterized by a strong tension to realize a greater social justice. It 
was also at the base of the “Long Sixty-Eight” and of the processes of decolonization. 
Enthusiasm is thus thought in opposition both to the monopolistic pretension of political 
innovation forwarded by communist parties in the past and to the exclusive competence on 
political-economical decisions claimed today by democratic élites. Re-thinking the 
enthusiasm that animated these historic sequences of the twentieth century should offer the 
possibility to respond to “the sad passions” that dominate the era of neoliberal administration 
of global democracy. 
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Introduction 
The hypotheses suggested in this essay originate from the studies that I have undertaken on 
thought, passion and political bodies. My research work examines the possibilities of political 
materialism in a post-Marxist perspective, yet far from any anti-Marxist notion fashionable 
today. My main goal is to go beyond the conceptions which reduce politics to a superstructure 
without its own power of determination. 
The propositions presented here collide with many polemical fronts: first of all, they clash 
against the conception which sees the turning point from Fordism to Post- Fordism as the key 
to explaining the entire history of the last hundred years. In other words, I reject the concept 
that everything that happens in politics is due to the capitalistic objectivation of the subjective 
creativity of the working class. I also take a distance from any idea that considers history as a 
history of a struggle between opposite economic interests. I think it’s necessary to 
acknowledge that there is an infinity of phenomena, events and sequences that can’t be 
analyzed as an effect of the capitalistic transformations, more or less determined by the class 
struggles. For instance, it must be recognized that in the name of socialism, communism, 
fascism and even of the New Deal it was deemed possible to change destiny, in every instance 
in a singular way, and to understand this we require adequate categories of analysis. 
Using Lacan’s terms, we can approach this kind of phenomena as subjective phenomena: 
“subjectifications” or “subjective processes”. However, it is important not to abuse this 
language by removing it from its field of relevance. A mistake made, for example, by Ernesto 
Laclau in his book On the Populist Reason, where he attempts to interpret Lacan’s thought 
with the idea of “inter-subjective relationships”. This is an interpretation which fails. 
Wherever Lacan speaks about the subject, he speaks about the interior division of every 
subject in front of its own singular object of desire: therefore, Lacan’s thought does not allow 
any meta-psychological generalization and this is not the way in which his teaching could 
help the search for new post-Marxist views. In this perspective it is far more interesting to 
think about how lacanian psychoanalysis finds objectivity, i.e. inside subjectivity rather than 
outside it. 
This is one of the most useful teachings for a renewal of materialism in politics. It is exactly 
thanks to this that I argue that also political thought and passions are able to create their own 
objects. Not always, but sometimes: when they take the shape of organizations that are able to 
transform the ideas of social justice into experimental issues. The first hypothesis that I 
propose here originated from ‘the Glorious Thirty Years (1945-1975)’. It was during this age 
that president Mao spoke about the “masses’ enthusiasm for Socialism”. 
 
1. ‘The Glorious Thirty Years’ as a singular age of social justice 
The principal feature of this period can be described as follows: it was the high point of the 
last hundred years in terms of wages, social security and public education, resulting in the 
reduction of social differences and the creation of the middle class; the epicenter was in 
Europe, but at the same time there was also the spread of policies of ‘de-colonization’, which 
were immediately criticized as ‘neo-colonialism’; at the geopolitical level, this era was also 
marked by the Cold War first, then by ‘peaceful coexistence’ and ‘détente’ between the two 
‘superpowers’, and in the meantime by the emergence of the ‘Movement of Non-Aligned 
countries’. 
There are three sets of characteristics which, when combined, can lead to a conclusion of 
major importance: that the exceptional peak of social justice of this era was initially made 
possible by the rivalry between the spheres of influence of American capitalism and Soviet 
socialism, in a time when the latter was still credible as a regime devoted to the creation of 
greater social justice. The expansion of that kind of regime aroused both love and fear, which 
can therefore be identified as the driving forces behind this golden era of universal decrease in 
the gap between the rich and the poor. 
 
2. The “enthusiasm of the masses for Socialism” as a key category to 
understand ‘the Glorious Thirty Years’ 
Speaking about the “enthusiasm of the masses for Socialism”, Mao alluded to the passion 
aroused by those political bodies that were inspired by the same Communist idea, though 
differently interpreted (i.e. the party-state of the USSR, China and that half of the world where 
their models were imitated). Even then there were good reasons to doubt that the socialist 
countries were really creating social justice, but the words of Mao and the actual universal 
trends of reducing social differences show that, in this age, such doubts were less important 
than both the “enthusiasm” and the fear for the spreading of communism. Happiness was a 
condition of politics, not only because prosperity was the obligatory promise of every regime, 
but also because the future was a source of hope in the socialist countries as well as in the 
capitalist ones. Saying that the “East wind” was blowing, the Chinese at that time were 
alluding to the fact that socialist States and communist parties were on the offensive on the 
world scene. 
 
3. The ‘Long Sixty-Eight’ as an explosion of ‘non-aligned particles’ 
The ‘Long Sixty-Eight’ is a widely accepted term in historical literature. I use it to indicate the 
political season that was possible worldwide between the Sixties and the Seventies, thanks to 
a multiplicity of organizations which were mostly inspired by Communist ideals, but not by 
Communist parties. At that time, in fact, these parties began to decline because of their 
subordination to the geo-political relationships between the Soviet and the American 
“superpowers”. 
By using the term “particle” to characterize the political groups of the ‘Long Sixty-Eight’, I 
aim to stress the ambiguous relationships between these groups and every kind of party: on 
the one hand, they tried to be organized as a party, but chose not to participate in elections nor 
to lead governments; on the other hand, their main goal was to change radically the political 
systems in order to promote greater social justice. 
Furthermore, by applying to these groups the attribute of ‘non-aligned’, I aim to stress their 
convergence with what is known as the ‘Non-Aligned Movement’, i.e. Third World 
governments demanding greater justice, but at the geopolitical level. 
Symbols of these phenomena were, for instance, the committees organized by the youth of 
every capitalistic metropolis in solidarity with the resistance of Vietnam. It is not a simple 
coincidence that both the political groups of the ‘Long Sixty-Eight’ and the movement of 
Third World governments were virtually contemporaneous in terms of beginnings, 
developments and final dispersion. 
 
4. The Chinese Cultural Revolution as a crucial sequence of the ‘Long 
Sixty-Eight’ 
The Cultural Revolution in China saw its enemy in the culture of a communist party leading a 
socialist State, but the repercussions of this event were universal during the ‘Long Sixty-
Eight’: this peculiar kind of revolution was cited everywhere by every political group born 
during this time. It is always relevant to ask ourselves why.  
The assumption maintained by the culture of those communist parties which were born in 
1921 was shared by other political cultures: it concerned the irreducible pre-eminence of 
experts. It is the famous assumption of Kautsky renewed by Lenin that theory does not arise 
from social movements, which are considered historically crucial, but politically blind. In the 
Leninist doctrine as it was established by Stalin and thereafter shared by all the communists 
faithful to the USSR, the perspective was even more restricted: so much so that the party’s 
central committee remained the only source of legitimate knowledge.  
Cultural pluralism was always openly defended in the capitalist world, but at the same time 
there was an essentially unchallenged assumption that in politics, as well as in other fields of 
culture, only experts are authorized to educate the non-experts. 
The Cultural Revolution destroyed this certitude. During this sequence, not only Mao’s 
thought was to be exalted, but also that of the masses.  
The investigations conducted by the experts among the masses seem today only one of many 
totalitarian injunctions which justified deportations and other ill-treatments of dissenters. 
However, this understanding fails to explain why the Cultural Revolution became a universal 
reference of the ‘Long Sixty-Eight’. It is not a coincidence that the investigations among the 
masses, even if otherwise called and with completely other aims, were thereafter considered 
an absolutely necessary condition of any political or economic strategy even in capitalist 
countries. 
 
5. The end of the ‘Long Sixty-Eight’ as the conclusion of the most 
relevant political experimentation in the last forty years 
The word ‘revolution’ nowadays is often used in an equivocal way as a synonym to ‘regime 
change’, i.e. to support the destabilization of local regimes with the aim of promoting various 
foreign interferences by the most powerful countries. The issue therefore is to restore political 
dignity to this word and all that it meant from the end of the Seventeenth to the end of 
Twentieth centuries. My proposition is that of rethinking this long cycle as a season of 
political experimentations. This choice is justified if we think that the category of revolution 
was first used in those astrophysical experiments which made the transition “from the closed 
world to the infinite universe” possible, according to the title of the famous book by 
Alexandre Koyré. Robespierre, for instance, was absolutely clear about the fact that the 
French revolution should be a continuation in the political field of what the Copernicus 
discovery had begun in the field of physics.  
Obviously, this experimental way to approach politics has to be distinguished from other 
kinds of approaches. In order to simplify this distinction, I propose to divide the latter into two 
types: the first one is normally called conservative politics and the other one is generally 
known as reactionary politics.  
Reducing the political issue to these three major categories (experimental, conservative and 
reactionary) has multiple theoretical consequences. But the basic assumption remains: the aim 
of conservative politics is to conserve the continuity of institutions, whereas the aim of 
reactionary politics is to react in front of an explosion of disorder, so as to restore an 
imaginary order. Both these types of politics are, however, different from the experimental 
one in a crucial feature: the latter is only possible if it is thought and experienced as a singular 
sequence, in discontinuity with all that precedes as well as with all that follows. It implies that 
we can draw a political lesson from each of these experiences only if we recognize that each 
one is deeply different from the others of the same type. But we also have to consider another 
point in this regard: just as in scientific or artistic experimentations, also in political ones, only 
the course of time decides on the success or failure. 
It is very significant that only a few years ago even the former President of France Nicolas 
Sarkozy declared that it was necessary to break with the aftermath of ‘Sixty-Eight’. The recent 
decline of his public image suggests that these consequences were stronger than he thought.  
As a matter of fact, every time conservative and reactionary politics become powerless and 
the need for new political experimentations emerges again, thinking about the ‘Long Sixty-
Eight’ is unavoidable. 
 
6. There is a correlation between the conclusion of ‘the Glorious Thirty 
Years of the welfare state’ and the end of Socialist states’ and Communist 
parties’ credibility 
In the second part of the Seventies, China definitely took the capitalist path that had always 
been opposed by the Cultural Revolution during the ten years of its different waves. In the 
same years, the USSR seemed to obtain some success with its traditional Cold War enemy in 
the diplomatic plan of the so called ‘Détente’ (for instance, in 1976 at the Conference of 
Helsinki which first recognized the division of Germany). At that time, the USA were deeply 
wounded by the end of the Vietnam war and by Nixon’s impeachment.  
Nevertheless, in both the Chinese and the Soviet instances, Communist universalism is 
explicitly abandoned for the benefit of nationalist interests. Neither enthusiasm nor fear could 
be generated within these countries anymore. All the socialist and communist parties and class 
organizations started to decline or to break definitely with their traditions. It was precisely in 
those years that ‘the Glorious Thirty’ came to the end. 
 
7. Starting from the Eighties, the global leadership has belonged to the 
neoliberal democratic regimes which follow the pattern of the so called 
‘biggest democracy in the world’ 
Towards the end of the Seventies, an unprecedented opportunity presented itself for the US. 
From the second post-war period until the Sixties, its influence was limited by the rise of 
Communism in half of the world and by the enthusiasm thus aroused. After the ‘Long Sixty-
Eight’, the Vietnam defeat and Nixon’s impeachment presented problems for the credibility of 
the ‘biggest democracy in the world’, which reached a low ebb. However, these problems 
were overcome as soon as a Hollywood actor entered the White House. While China was 
folding in on itself in order to reestablish a capitalist system, the USSR was trying to recover 
from ‘stagnation’ by embarking on the Soviet-Afghan war, which indeed contributed to its 
definitive collapse. Following this, Communism, class parties and class organizations lost all 
credibility, and therefore so did the ideals of social justice they conveyed. 
More than one century of experiences in the name of these ideals was reduced to nothing. This 
bleak void is one of the first conditions of the epochal turning point which became possible 
during the Eighties: on one hand, the particular pattern of American democracy can work as a 
universal model for democracy; on the other hand, this pattern can also impose a new version 
of economic liberalism. Nothing will be able to hinder the global hegemony of neoliberal 
democracy anymore. Thanks to its different interpretations, now more democratic, now more 
neoliberal, this kind of regime will be adopted by all the governments of the richest countries, 
which each suffer from every kind of criticism and opposition, but remain more unified 
around the same strategic mainstream than ever before. 
 
8. The present democratic regimes are all constituted by neoliberal 
political ideals 
In other words, it is vain both to fear the existence of a capitalism without democracy (as 
Žižek and Sloterdijk maintain) and to hope in a democracy beyond capitalism (as Hardt and 
Negri maintain). Neo-liberalism is often criticized nowadays, but always as a limitation of (or 
a threat to) democracy. On the contrary, it is important to admit that capitalism needs both 
democracy and neo-liberalism (as Badiou maintains). The point is that in our time, despite all 
the increasing riots and general disorders, there is ‘no alternative’. In this absence of political 
and intellectual alternatives, the leading world democracies can reduce the traditional 
distinction between the rulers and the ruled, the capitalists and the workers, the rich and the 
poor, to a biological distinction between the worthier and the less worthy: that is, between the 
fit and the less fit to survive.  
Helping disadvantaged populations has become less of a problem for governments. The 
solution they propose is to increase philanthropic operations, whose aim is to extend financial 
power to the utmost limits. Worldwide, people such as the 'ninja' (no income, no job, no 
asset), the homeless or the poor have been seduced by capitalism and integrated into the 
system of debts and credits. This is the result of carefully calculated capitalist interests, but 
also of the unchallenged belief that the so called rules of the market are the most democratic 
way to select and reward people and communities. 
 
9. “Superclass” and “the bottom billiard”: beyond the ruled world 
As democratization implies a single political strategy, its main result is the global increase in 
social differences. During the Nineties, some poor countries began to become richer, but 
within every one of these countries the gap between the poor and the rich increased 
dramatically. In 2008 Rothkopf (author of the book Superclass) counted six thousand “Very 
Important Persons” who live far from public eye, but are able to condition the destinies of the 
six billion or more people who live on the Earth. Whereas Collier counted in his book A 
Bottom Billion of people condemned to fight hunger, thirst, illness and local wars only to 
survive. 
The class struggle theory was the most important interpretation of the classical theory of the 
division between rulers and ruled, but I maintain it is no longer so. 
What is missing nowadays is the social battlefield itself: the most important political problem 
has become the global injustice suffered by all the growing populations explicitly abandoned 
by every government. It is not enough to analyze and to emphasize the contingent conflicts 
that those populations fight against exterior effects of the domination of the “superclass”: the 
most important political question is how to unify the “bottom billion” around new strategic 
ideas. 
 
10. Do we live in the “era of sad passions” (as described by Benasayag 
and Schmit)? Definitely, in one of political apathy 
What is necessary for survival depends today not directly on nature, but on the decisions of 
the powers able to make natural resources available: and that is true everywhere. But these 
powers are limiting their range of action more and more. Increasing populations thus see their 
hopes reduced. Not only in the world peripheries, but also at the heart of capitalistic countries 
where both unemployment and wages too low for workers to survive are already considered 
normal. The time when the future was a source of hope is only an old memory. Nobody 
knows how or where the faith in progress can come back. In the psychoanalytical field, a 
growth of sad passions is noted. In the political one, we simply notice an absence of passions. 
In this regard the principal problem is, in my view, that the conditions for experimenting with 
the ideals of social justice are completely new: beyond every conflict between rulers and the 
ruled, without any certainty of global progress. If that is the case, first of all intellectual work 
is necessary to renew a debate about the way to conceive these kinds of experiments. 
 
11. Beyond the juxtaposition between democracy and dictatorship 
I don’t know if it is the case elsewhere, but in Europe we are often told that the rulers have to 
do their ‘homework’ as dictated by the requirements of markets. If we consider that the word 
“dictatorship” comes exactly from the verb “to dictate”, it follows that the “dictatorship of 
markets” is something more than a fictional story created by incurable extremists. On the 
contrary, the assumption that the many countries allied with the US are ruled in a democratic 
way is not at all realistic. In effects, this assumption works only to hide the power of the 
“super-class” who is able to condition markets and politicians. 
The self-evident fact is that no political action (meeting or demonstration, negotiation or 
choice of candidates, election or management of election results, and so on) is possible, if its 
conditions are not preliminarily dictated by some entity which has the power to decide them. 
Recognizing that doesn’t imply the nihilistic conclusion that all politics are dictatorial, yet 
entails an admission ever more important today: that in any politics there is always a 
dictatorial “feature” (according to the terminology of Mao’s text On the Correct Handling of 
Contradictions Among the People (1957)’, which can be treated into two opposite ways; on 
the one hand, this feature could be declared, democratically discussed so that to limit its 
consequences; on the other hand, if this feature is hidden, its consequences are unlimited and 
democracy is reduced to simulacrum. 
But there is also another important implication coming from the admission that no democracy 
can exist without “dictating”. This implication is that no people can have force (according to 
the etymological root of the word “democracy”), if there aren't intellectual authors able to 
dictate how and when this force could be conceived and organized. It is not a coincidence that 
among all the greatest political thinkers it is impossible to find one who believes in 
democracy as such. And the fact that this belief is virtually obligatory nowadays, shows just 
how low the passions for politics are. 
 
12. Rethinking the “enthusiasm” of the ‘Long Sixty-Eight’ 
That the engine of capitalism is greed is not news.  
In the last thirty years the novelty has rather been the absence of ideas and organized bodies 
searching for greater social justice. It is for this reason that today the desire to become richer 
and richer has no limits, even if fewer and fewer people can be satisfied in this quest. 
Technical propositions to exit from the crisis are not lacking. The lack is instead of a politics 
able to experiment with these propositions. Numerous economists invoke their arrival, but the 
years pass and there is no sign of it. 
Therefore, it is not an academic or nostalgic exercise to rethink ‘the Glorious Thirty Years’, 
the ‘Long Sixty-Eight’ and the ‘enthusiasm’ for a greater social justice aroused by the ‘East 
wind’. At the beginning, all that was possible thanks to the opposition between the two parties 
present everywhere in the period after the Second World War: i.e. the communist and the anti-
communist ones.  
Nevertheless, further experiments seeking to establish greater social justice were pushed to the 
most extreme consequences above all by small groups with big ideas and passions. 
Isn't this the best example of what there still is to think and do in politics?  
How to learn from the masses, through adequate inquiries? How to experiment with models 
for establishing greater social justice, starting from where governments are absent? How to 
organize a new politics, whose aim is not simply to gain power?  
These three and many other fundamental questions of the ‘Long Sixty-Eight’ are certainly not 
anachronistic. 
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